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The Courts in National Security Policy
By: Liam Kerr, Gettysburg College
Abstract
 Presidential authority in the realm of national 
security policy has increased since George Washing-
ton’s administration. The most noticeable expansion 
of America’s position in global hegemon followed 
the allied victory in World War II. Accompanying the 
rapid increase in the Executive Branch’s authority 
has been deference from the traditional constraints 
on the President’s power, namely Congress and public 
opinion. This paper seeks to answer the question of 
whether the Judicial Branch, specifically the Supreme 
Court, has acted overall to constrain or enable the ex-
pansion of presidential war powers. This question will 
be examined through a qualitative analysis of existing 
academic literature and Supreme Court opinions.
Introduction
 Since the end of World War II, the Executive 
Branch of the United States government has expanded 
its scope of power. The rise of American global hege-
mony was further solidified with the fall of the Soviet 
Union in 1991. Presidents since George Washington 
have taken executive actions, which challenged con-
temporary understandings of the proper role of the 
office. The Founding Fathers disagreed greatly about 
the “war powers” of the presidency, evidenced in the 
Constitution, the Federalist Papers, and other founda-
tional writings of the American democratic philoso-
phy. Writing to fellow founder of the Democratic-Re-
publican Party, James Madison opined to Thomas 
Jefferson that “The constitution supposes, what the 
History of all Govts demonstrates, that the Ex. is the 
branch of power most interested in war, & most prone 
to it. It has accordingly with studied care, vested the 
question of war in the Legisl.”1 On the opposite end 
of the spectrum was Federalist Alexander Hamilton, a 
staunch advocate for presidential power according to 
the English model. Hamilton surmised that the presi-
dent held significant authority “In the conduct of war, 
in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark 
1 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 2, 1798, in The Writings of James Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt, http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/documents/a 1_8_11s8.html.
2 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist No. 70, in The Federalist, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-70
3 Amos A. Jordan, William J. Taylor, Michael J. Meese, and Suzanne C. Nielson, American National Security. 6th ed. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2009), 97.
of the national security.”2 As the following paper will 
illustrate, the debate between American policymakers 
regarding the primacy of the Executive Branch has 
flourished from the founding of the nation to the war 
on terrorism.  
 Jordan, Taylor, Meese, & Nielson (2009) dis-
cussed whether there are effective checks on presiden-
tial powers and which actors in the policymaking pro-
cess are most impactful on the distribution of national 
security authority. They concluded that, in addition 
to the tensions between the president and Congress, 
other influential actors include “public opinion, inter-
est groups, the impact of past policies and programs, 
the responsiveness of the executive bureaucracy, and 
the views, interests, and expected reactions of other 
nations.”3 Conspicuously excluded from the list is the 
Judicial Branch of the US government. This paper will 
seek to analyze the impact of the courts on US nation-
al security policymaking, focusing more specifically 
on the effect of Supreme Court (SCOTUS) decisions 
and jurisprudence on legal attitudes and interpreta-
tions. In particular, the research presented seeks to 
answer whether the Supreme Court has enabled or 
limited the operations of executive policy-making in 
national security-related issues. Given the national 
attention drawn to several landmark decisions, such 
as Nixon v. U.S. (discussed later), it is theorized that 
the following research will demonstrate that SCOTUS 
acted as a significant overall constraint on constantly 
expanding presidential powers.
The Arguments: Jurisprudence and Precedent
 The aforementioned debate between America’s 
greatest political philosophers during the time of the 
nation’s founding laid the groundwork for centuries of 
legal argumentation. Constitutional legal experts have 
debated the question of presidential war powers from 
the beginning of our republic on issues such as George 
Washington’s suppression of the Whiskey Rebellion, 
Thomas Jefferson’s deployment of Marines to the 
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Barbary Coast, James Polk’s instigations with Mexico 
and Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus 
rights. The legal arguments surrounding expansionary 
versus limited war powers parallel broader debates 
between strict and loose constitutional interpretation. 
James Baker, a notable public servant under several 
Republican administrations, struck at the importance 
of constitutional interpretation when he said, “As the 
president’s national security lawyer, I was initially 
surprised how often my legal analysis started and of-
ten ended, with the text of the Constitution.”4 National 
security decisions require legal analysis. The follow-
ing discussion on legal precedent and interpretation 
will provide the proper backdrop for an analysis of 
SCOTUS’ impact on national security policy.
 There are several notable 19th-century exam-
ples of judicial review and subsequent constraint of 
presidential power by the courts. One such example is 
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Ex Parte Merryman, 
where he condemns Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas 
Corpus: a power expressly granted to the Legislative 
Branch.5 Most modern legal experts, however, tend 
to focus on a handful of 20th and 21st-century cases 
when determining executive powers in national securi-
ty policy. Baker outlines the two cases which represent 
the two opposing ends of the spectrum of debate.   
 The first such case is that of U.S. v. Cur-
tiss-Wright Export Corp. (1936) in which Justice 
Sutherland wrote the court’s majority opinion. The 
issue at hand was whether Congress had the ability 
to delegate to the President power to restrict weapon 
exports to the parties of the Chaco War. In his opinion, 
Sutherland concluded that the President is the “sole 
organ of the federal government in the field of inter-
national relations- a power which does not require as 
a basis for its exercise an act of Congress” and there-
fore, he, “not Congress, has the better opportunity of 
knowing conditions which prevail in foreign countries 
and especially in time of war. He has his confidential 
sources of information....”6 Sutherland further added 
an unprecedented allotment of authority to the execu-
4 James E. Baker, In the Common Defense: National Security Law for Perilous Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 33.
5 Bruce A. Ragsdale, Ex Parte Merryman, and Debates on Civil Liberties During the Civil War. Federal Judicial Center. Federal Judicial Center 
History Office. 2007.
6 Baker, 39.
7 “United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).” Justia Law. Accessed April 17, 2018.
8 Baker, 41.
9 “Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).” Justia Law. Accessed April 17, 2018.
tive by stating “external sovereignty” exists above the 
confines of the Constitution, inherent to the Union and 
leaving the President, as the sole organ of international 
relations, with almost limitless power in national secu-
rity.7  
 As influential as the Curtiss-Wright decision 
was in  national security jurisprudence, another case 
stands as a more prominent precedent in constitutional 
law. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. vs. Sawyer (1952) 
saw a legal challenge to President Truman’s decision 
to nationalize the steel industry in order to prevent 
a potential national security crisis resulting from 
a national steelworker strike. Although there were 
many significant concurring and dissenting opinions 
which are all referenced by lawyers today, it is Justice 
Black’s majority opinion and Justice Frankfurter’s 
concurring opinion which have proven most impact-
ful. Black argued that, “Even though ‘theater of war’ 
be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness 
to our constitutional system hold that [the President] 
has the ultimate power to take possession of private 
property.”8 Because this was concerned with domestic 
powers, it is possible such an assertion is still consis-
tent with Justice Sutherland’s Curtiss-Wright opinion. 
Ironically, this case is more widely referenced to justi-
fy expanding presidential powers due to what Justice 
Frankfurter called the executive “gloss” of presidential 
authority. He states that presidential war powers are 
justified by “a systematic, unbroken, executive prac-
tice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress 
and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents 
who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution.”9 The 
Youngstown case stands as the preeminent backdrop to 
cases pertaining to executive national security actions. 
 Youngstown and Curtiss-Wright demonstrate 
the vast differences in Supreme Court decisions. 
These cases, however, are not the only examples. 
Chris Edelson discusses the infamous Korematsu v. 
United States, in which Justice Stone led the court in 
answering “whether, acting in cooperation, Congress 
and the Executive have constitutional authority to 
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impose the curfew restrictions here complained of.”10 
Mirroring language used in the Curtiss-Wright major-
ity opinion and Justice Franklin’s concurring opinion 
in Youngstown, Justice Stone concluded that, “the 
two branches, acting together, possess the complete 
war power of the national government.”11 Therefore, 
since Congress permitted President Roosevelt to force 
Japanese-Americans into internment camps during 
a time of emergency, the action was constitutionally 
acceptable. It should be pointed out, for reference 
later in this paper, that Justice Franklin noted in his 
Youngstown concurrence that “no such cooperation 
between Congress and the President existed and there-
fore the action was unconstitutional.”  
 The ageless debate between expansionary and 
limited presidential ascendancy in national security 
powers thrived within the walls of the Supreme Court 
since the founding of the nation. These three 20th cen-
tury cases often provided the foundational context for 
further interpretation of the president’s delegated and 
implied war powers. The question then becomes, has 
the Supreme Court significantly limited or enabled the 
expansion of executive power which has taken place, 
especially since the end of WWII? Scholars disagree 
regarding this question, but this paper will organize 
historical examples corroborating both sides of the 
academic debate into a framework that explains why 
differences in historical jurisprudence exist.  
The Case for Activism
 Those who believe the presidency has been 
hindered in its pursuit of greater power by the Su-
preme Court follow the pattern of analyzing cases 
from the 20th and 21st centuries. Christenson and Kri-
ner examine recent examples relating to the unprece-
dented levels of presidential imperium during the pres-
idency of George W. Bush and his war on terrorism. 
Their take on the effectiveness of the courts’ reining 
in of presidents stems from the notion that, “For most 
of American history, the courts rationally shied away 
10 Chris. Edelson, Emergency Presidential Power from the Drafting of the Constitution to the 
War on Terror. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2013.
11 Ibid., 85.
12 Dino P. Christenson and Douglas L. Kriner, “The Specter of Supreme Court Criticism: Public Opinion and Unilateral Action.” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 47, no. 3 (2017): 471-494.
13 Ibid.
14 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 (2004)
15 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557 (2006)
16 Roger Douglas, Law, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Terrorism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2014), 174.
from direct confrontations with the executive branch 
(Fisher 2005). Even some of the rare presidential de-
feats, such as the landmark ruling in Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), may have paradoxically 
bolstered presidential power in the long term (Sil-
verstein 1997; Bellia 2002).”12 Despite this historical 
deference, Christenson and Kriner come to the conclu-
sion that the Supreme Court has increasingly asserted 
its authority to decide when the executive branch has 
overstepped its supposed mandate in national security 
policy-making.
 Three cases are cited by Christenson and 
Kriner as evidence of the trend of increasing judicial 
activism. In the 2004 case Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,  the 
court ruled that “The administration could not hold 
American citizens as enemy combatants and deny 
them due process and habeas corpus rights.”13 Justice 
O’Connor wrote the majority opinion, asserting that 
a state of war does not grant “a blank check for the 
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s 
citizens.”14 Just two years later, the court ruled in 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the military tribunals created 
by the President were unconstitutional. Justice Stevens 
continued by saying the defendant’s argument that 
“federal courts should respect the balance Congress 
struck when it created ‘an integrated system of mili-
tary courts and review procedures’ is inapposite since 
the tribunal convened to try Hamdan is not part of that 
integrated system.”15 In this decision, the court echoes 
earlier notions that legislative assent to executive ac-
tion lends greater levels of legitimacy to the executive 
branch’s national security policy. Finally, the Su-
preme Court ruled in Boumediene v. Bush (2008) that 
Guantanamo prisoners were entitled to vie for habeas 
corpus rights. Roger Douglas notes that although there 
existed an acknowledged “right to detain,” that right 
“did not necessarily mean a right to detain unfettered 
by judicial accountability.”16 
 Two notable cases arose during the admin-
istration of President Richard Nixon which Edelson 
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considers equally as prominent in case law. The first is 
New York Times Co. v. United States (1971), in which 
Justice Black declared that Nixon overstepped his 
authority by censoring publication of the leaked Penta-
gon Papers, which revealed government knowledge of 
the impossibility of winning the Vietnam War. Black 
opined, “In revealing the workings of government 
that led to the Vietnam war, the newspapers nobly did 
precisely that which the Founders hoped and trusted 
they would do.”17 Noticeably, President Nixon acted 
without the authorization of Congress and therefore 
lacked the clout enjoyed by President Roosevelt in 
Curtiss-Wright. Another case involving President Nix-
on was the more popularly acclaimed case of United 
States v. Nixon (1974) which related to the President’s 
claim of executive authority in releasing audio record-
ings of conversations had in the Oval Office. Although 
this case does not deal with national security issues, 
the President still claimed that executive privilege de-
rived from concerns over national security information 
which would be dangerous to release.  Justice Burger 
led the unanimous court in reaffirming that “it is the 
province and duty of this Court ‘to say what the law is’ 
with respect to the claim of privilege presented in this 
case [Marbury v. Madison]....”18
 Edelson, Christenson, Kriner, and Douglas all 
share the belief that the Supreme Court has significant-
ly constrained the presidency on many issues which 
are presented to them. While they recognize that the 
Supreme Court has at other times enhanced presiden-
tial authority, they argue that the general trend is an 
increase of judicial activism as the Executive Branch 
has grown in size and scope. This stance is followed 
by the opposite argument: that the Supreme Court has, 
on the whole, acted to enable the president’s enhance-
ment of power through deference, save a few isolated 
examples to the contrary.
The Case for Deference
    Conventional academic teaching emphasizes the 
role of the courts in having authority on the meaning 
17 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U. S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)
18 United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974)
19 Robert F. Blomquist, “The Theoretical Constitutional Shape (And Shaping) of American National Security Law.” St. Louis University Public 
Law Review 31, no. 1 (2011): 439-473.
20 Fisher, Louis. “The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The “Sole Organ” Doctrine.” Presidential Studies Quarterly 37, no. 1 (March 2007): 139-
52.
21 James Madison, Letters of Helvidius, nos. 1-4.  24 Aug. - 14 Sept. 1793, in The Writings of James Madison, ed. Gaillard Hunt.
and proper application of the law in relation to the 
Constitution and existing case law. What if, however, 
the President and Congress actually share the respon-
sibility of interpreting the law and the Constitution? 
Robert Blomquist and other advocates for presiden-
tial unilateralism argue that, as constitutional entities 
with delegated powers, the Executive and Legisla-
tive Branches possess the ability to define their roles 
under the Constitution. Focusing on this power, called 
‘presiprudence,’ Blomquist perceives the presidency 
as “the American national security sentinel based on a 
broad - but not unlimited - interpretation of presiden-
tial power.”19  A familiar argument to constitutional 
lawyers, such a theory is based heavily on a recur-
rent assessment of presidential power known as the 
“sole organ” doctrine, drawn from a speech by John 
Marshall in 1800.20 The sole organ doctrine, which 
was cited as justification in the aforementioned Cur-
tiss-Wright decision, has been used to substantiate the 
notion that the executive is empowered as the primary 
actor in foreign relations.  
 Blomquist relies on the sole organ doctrine 
in defining the concept of presiprudence, a term he 
coined, which has been an assertion made by advo-
cates of presidential power since Alexander Hamil-
ton.  It is ironic that the doctrine was conceived by 
the mastermind of judicial review, particularly since 
Blomquist uses the doctrine in subjecting presidential 
action in national security policy to simply “reason-
ably deferential judicial review.” As the frequent and 
natural foil to Federalist rhetoric, James 
Madison provided his input on Hamilton and Mar-
shall’s pronouncement of executive authority when he 
said “Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the 
nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a 
war ought to be commenced, continued, or conclud-
ed.”21 Madison’s school won in the infamous case U.S. 
v. Nixon, in which the court asserted its sole authority 
to interpret the law. Blomquist repeats the frequent 
concept that “privileging the president’s perspec-
tive on national security needs carefully balanced by 
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Congress’ perspective.”22 Yet again, judicial review of 
presidential action seems to hinge on whether
 Congress has granted unilateral presidential dominion 
over an issue.
 Several other scholars have spoken on this top-
ic to reinforce the sentiment that courts have conceded 
significant authority to the presidency. Gregory Mc-
Neal wrote an extended review of an academic book 
entitled In the Age of Deference, by David Rudenstine. 
Emphasized in the review is an assessment of the 
classic dichotomy between liberty and security, most 
famously alluded to by Benjamin Franklin. “Ruden-
stine claims that ‘the Courts deferential stance has 
substantially harmed the nation-and done so needless-
ly-by compromising individual liberty, the rule of law, 
and the democratic process’” (633).23 The Supreme 
Court has often decided on issues concerning individ-
ual liberties and commonly found that national securi-
ty concerns rightly supersede privileges guaranteed by 
the Bill of Rights. Perhaps the most famous example 
in illustrating this point is the notable case Schenck v. 
U.S. (1919), in which Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Jr. issued the unanimous majority opinion that free-
dom of speech is outweighed by national security 
concerns expressed under the Espionage Act. Now a 
colloquial phrase in case law, Justice Holmes inaugu-
rated the “clear and present danger” test in determin-
ing whether speech could rightfully be limited.  In this 
case, and in others relating to civil liberties guaranteed 
by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has a history 
of occasionally permitting executive national secu-
rity actions which appear contradictory to the Bill of 
Rights. 
 Since the beginning of the War on Terrorism, 
following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in 
Washington, D.C., national security has been a prima-
ry concern of most Americans. The administrations of 
Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Don-
ald J. Trump have used the prevalence of fear in citi-
zen’s minds to expand their powers in fighting the War 
on Terror. Congress authorized unilateral presidential 
22 Blomquist.
23 Gregory S. McNeal, “Deference, Power, and Emerging Security Threats.” Texas Law Review 95, no. 3 (2017): 631-650. Academic Search 
Premier, EBSCOhost (accessed March 19, 2018).
24 Douglas, 112.
25 Alexander Steven Zbrokek, “Square Pegs and Round Holes: Moving Beyond Bivens in National Security Cases.” Columbia Journal of Law & 
Social Problems 47, no. 4 (2014): 485-524.
26 Ibid.
action in the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Mili-
tary Force (AUMF) against perpetrators of the attacks 
and associated groups. The vague language enabled 
the president to use military force almost anywhere in 
the world, so long as there was a loose connection to 
terrorist organizations. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Su-
preme Court allowed President Bush to detain individ-
uals related to the terrorist attacks, including American 
citizens.  Congress’ authorization contributed signifi-
cant legitimacy to presidential actions since 2001.  
 Judicial deference to expanding presidential 
power is nothing new in the modern era, Douglas 
argues, as he found that “state secrets claims failed 
in only 4 out of 58 reported cases in the period 1977-
2005.”24 In other words, the argument that state secrets 
are at risk, and therefore a matter beyond the courts’ 
jurisdiction, has largely been successful in modern 
courtrooms. In 1971, SCOTUS ruled for the first time 
in the case Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents that 
those deprived of constitutional liberties are subject 
to remedy by the government and such victims have 
standing to sue before the court. Since the Bivens 
doctrine was conceived, the Court has only weakened 
its effectiveness through the creation of what Zbrokek 
calls the “national security exemption.”25 In federal 
court cases which never reached the Supreme Court, 
known as Aulaqi I and Aulaqi II, judges ruled that the 
family of American citizen Anwar al-Awlaki, who was 
killed by drone strikes ordered by President Obama, 
lacked standing to sue and dismissed the case. Plain-
tiffs argued that al-Awlaki was deprived of life and 
liberty without constitutional due process and that his 
estate was subject to remedy according to the Bivens 
doctrine. This is the most recent, yet most extreme, 
example of the national security exemption. Zbrokek 
claims that, “By foreclosing Bivens actions to vic-
tims of government action, the courts have potentially 
deprived American citizens of constitutional protec-
tions and crafted an expansive exemption for national 
security-related suits.”26 The national security exemp-
tion is significant not only in conversations of afford-
ing remedies to victims of government action, viewed 
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by John Marshall to be essential to the enforcement of 
constitutional guarantees, but also in simply deciding 
when or whether government action supersedes civil 
liberties. 
Preventing an ‘Imperial Presidency’
    Responding to weighty evidence suggesting note-
worthy judicial acquiescence of authority to presi-
dential sovereignty in external relations, a growing 
number of American scholars, politicians, and ideolog-
ical groups have offered actions to rein in presidential 
power.  One such method in preventing the further rise 
of the “imperial presidency,” a term popularized by 
presidential historian Arthur Schlesinger, is a reliance 
on Congress to mandate statutory limits on executive 
power. The analysis of the extent to which Congress 
has deferred and enabled the rise of an imperial presi-
dency is a matter for individual analysis. As this paper 
has demonstrated, however, Congress has an important 
role in legitimizing presidential power when it comes 
to judicial interpretation. Likewise, a potential method 
for reform, identified by Gregory McNeal, is for Con-
gress to “create processes and procedures that bind 
courts and the Executive. Congress can force structure 
around doctrine and can even force a conversation 
about what deference doctrines are constitutionally 
mandated.”27 Considering the Legislative Branch has 
blissfully delegated its power to the Executive Branch 
in the past, it seems unlikely for any such congressio-
nal reform to be implemented.
 Focusing on the development of the national 
security exemption in relation to civil liberties and 
constitutional guarantees, Alexander Zbrokek offers 
his prescribed proper judicial reform relating to the 
Bivens doctrine (described as inherently inadequate).  
Therefore, he advocates for the creation of an “Ar-
ticle I court with jurisdiction over post-deprivation 
constitutional claims in national security cases.”28 
Would such a court be sufficient in increasing judicial 
assertiveness overall, or would the statutory scope be 
so narrow as to inadequately address the larger issue? 
While the court would “close the rights/remedies gap 
generated by the national security exception to the 
Bivens doctrine and compel the Government to ac-
count for its actions,” it is unlikely that the growth in 
the authority of the Executive Branch would be sig-
27 McNeal, 637
28 Zbrokek.
29 Baker, In the Common Defense, 307.
nificantly impacted.  
 Seeking institutional checks and balances to 
the growing system of presidential unilateralism on 
national security matters will likely prove
ineffective. As is evidenced by the founding docu-
ments and writings of even the staunchest advocates 
of executive power, checks and balances are central to 
a functioning American government. In other words, 
it was expected that the power of the presidency was 
properly balanced by shared powers between the other 
two branches of the federal government as well as the 
states. It appears that, over time, institutional checks 
are meaningless if the values of the American people 
change. As has perhaps happened already, “assertions 
of presidential authority made in extremis may become 
embedded in U.S. practice and law without a corre-
sponding application of checks and balances.” This 
“may in time diminish both the principles of law that 
define American life as well as the physical security 
at which they are directed.”29 Therefore, James Baker 
prescribes a “sustained commitment to the rule of law 
in practice and perception” as the proper response to 
dynamic and multifaceted threats to American nation-
al security. Only through an increased understanding 
of founding legal principles and constitutional law 
can existing institutional checks and balances begin 
significantly limiting presidential power in external 
relations.
Conclusion
    The goal of this paper was to examine existing 
scholarly literature and debate surrounding the ques-
tion of executive authority in national security pol-
icymaking, and to subsequently determine whether 
the Supreme Court has historically enabled or limit-
ed presidential power. The hypothesis proposed the 
existence of considerable evidence would indicate that 
the Supreme Court has limited the president through 
judicial review. After careful review of case law and 
opinions from national security legal experts, it ap-
pears that the original hypothesis is null. Through lack 
of action in the face of executive power-grabs (due to 
SCOTUS’s nature as a reactionary force), the courts 
have enabled an expanding definition of presidential 
war powers. While courts have occasionally limited 
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powers of the president, these limits occur in very spe-
cific circumstances and tend to reinforce Blomquist’s 
idea of “reasonably deferential judicial review.” 
 Supreme Court actions can be organized into 
the following framework to explain the historical vari-
ation in levels of deference. First mentioned during 
the conversation surrounding Korematsu, but recurrent 
throughout this paper, is the idea that Congress lend-
ing legitimacy to presidential action cannot be under-
scored. Christenson, however, discusses the influence 
of public opinion on presidential action. He further 
demonstrates how a Supreme Court case surrounding 
the action influences public opinion, the outcome of 
the case, and the future actions of the president.
 Therefore, the above flowchart helps to explain 
what considerations matter most in the outcome of 
national security cases before the Court. It should be 
noted that these outcomes are only likely according 
to this research and could change given the personal 
opinions or ideologies of the particular individuals on 
the Supreme Court. A good example to illustrate this 
flowchart is the aforementioned Ex Parte Merryman 
case in which a federal district court ruled against 
President Lincoln’s suspension of Habeas Corpus. 
Lincoln did not have approval from Congress to exer-
cise their constitutional responsibility and uproar arose 
from the American people who were already inclined 
to call the President a tyrant. Such conditions being 
met, the court, chaired by Chief Justice Roger Taney, 
ruled against Lincoln. Lincoln, however, simply ig-
nored the decision and carried on.  
 The ascendancy of the president in national 
security policy is the greatest change in American 
government. Shifting perception of the proper role of 
the presidency paired with the changing threats facing 
the United States has led to the primacy of the Exec-
utive Branch. Traditionally, public opinion, Congress, 
and the Courts are most readily equipped to check 
wrongful assertions of executive power. Resulting 
from a greater degree of deferral from the public and 
Congress, however, has been a general trend towards 
judicial deference. Although the Supreme Court has 
decided against presidential powers in individual 
examples, the legal precedents set by Youngstown and 
Curtiss-Wright have worked what Blomquist calls 
‘presiprudence’ into accepted legal doctrine. Going 
forward, the Supreme Court is likely to continue in 
this tradition, given an increased and ill-defined threat 
from non-state actors, terrorist organizations, signifi-
cant power tensions, and nuclear weapons. 
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